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Abstract — Major views about the business cycle are tested by using NIPA data of the US economy for the years 
1929-2013. Direct acyclic graphs (DAGs) are used for identification purposes, i.e., as tool to elucidate causal issues. 
Results show that (a) investment is not autonomous, as it is stimulated by profits and consumption, and damped 
by government spending; (b) profits are reduced by past investment; (c) both business investment and profits 
have negative effects on government spending which consequently appears as an endogenous rather than as an 
exogenous variable. Regularities identified in the data are sufficient to generate the cycle. Considering the results, 
the “regularity” of the business cycle, and the fact that after growing between 2008 and 2012, profits stagnated in 
2013 and declined in 2014, it can be concluded with reasonable confidence that a recession will occur in the next 
few years. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Do we know the cause or causes of recessions? Are we able to predict them? Can they be prevented? In 
recent years distinguished economists have given explicit or implicit negative answers to these ques-
tions. In the opinion of Edward Leamer (2010, 31-46), economists’ understanding “of causal effects in 
macroeconomics is virtually nil, and will remain so.” For Eugene Fama economists do not know what 
causes recessions (Cassidy 2010, 28), and for Nicholas Mankiw it is basically impossible to predict them, 
because economic fluctuations do not follow any predictable pattern (Mankiw 2009); indeed future re-
cessions will occur “at some unknown date for some unknown reason” (Mankiw 2010, B6). 
 Though many economists would agree with these views, many others would disagree, as they have 
proposed and sometimes vehemently argued about why recessions occur, or more generally, about the 
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causes of the business cycle. An examination of the views of economists of different inclinations indi-
cates that many conceptualize the business cycle in the framework of a built-in ability of the market 
economy to balance itself toward equilibrium. Therefore oscillations of the economy between prosper-
ous business conditions and crisis, between expansion and recession, would be just manifestations of 
the reaction of the economy to exogenous causes. Thus injudicious actions of governments or central 
bankers (Schwartz 2010; Butler 2010), spikes in oil prices due to a variety of factors (Hamilton 1988, 
593; Hamilton 2009, 215-267), idiosyncratic events impacting big firms and propagating through net-
works (Gabaix 2011, 733-772; Acemoglu et al. 2012, 1977-2016), or other undefined “shocks” which per-
haps generate economic uncertainty (Bloom 2014, 153-76) are for some economists the exogenous 
causes that from time to time push the economy down to recession. An alternative vision is that eco-
nomic disturbances have endogenous causes, so that business cycles are determined by the inner work-
ings of the market system. In this view, which is usually associated with the Keynesian school (Keynes 
1936; Kalecki 1954; Robinson 1979; Minsky 2008), the market economy would be unstable and prone 
to periods in which factors of production are unemployed.  
More than a century ago W. S. Jevons and H.L. Moore attributed business cycles to astronomical 
influences, but the effort to look for patterns that may explain the dynamics of the economy, its move-
ments toward expansion or contraction, has been continuous. Since the 1930s when Keynes and others 
in his tradition conceptualized the boom-and-bust cycle as an endogenous phenomenon of the market 
economy, it has been normal to look for explanatory patterns of the cycle in four basic macroeconomic 
variables that are monetary aggregates: consumption, investment, profits and government spending. 
This paper tries to examine and test the role of these four variables in the causation of the business 
cycle using modern techniques to assess causality. As it will be shown, examining and testing the causal 
role of these four variables in the business cycle allows gaining quite a bit of insight in understanding 
the way the economy works. To make a bet on that, the paper ends with a forecast based on the insights 
on the business cycle which are inferred from the results of the analysis.  
The view that consumption may have an important role as a generative factor of the business cycle 
was criticized decades ago by business-cycle experts of high reputation as Schumpeter and Haberler. 
Schumpeter thought that a basic criticism of underconsumption explanations is that they neglect an 
elementary fact, that inadequacy of wages “to buy the whole product at cost-covering prices would not 
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prevent hitchless production in response to the demand of non-wage earners either for ‘luxury’ goods 
or for investment” (Schumpeter 1954) (p. 740). For Haberler (1960) attribution of business cycles to 
insufficient consumption, that is, underconsumption theories, have a scientific standard quite lower 
than other theories of the business cycle. Then, if insufficient consumption is a discredited theory of the 
business cycle, why to look at it? A plausible answer is that “discredited theories” rarely die in social 
science, and under different garbs the causal role of consumption in business cycles is today very present 
in economics. Nowadays many economists would agree with the idea that recessions are caused by a 
combination of “shocks,” which could be for instance monetary shocks, as for Milton Friedman the 
quantity of money has a key role influencing the growth of the economy. In real-business-cycle (RBC) 
theory these shocks which would be the exogenous causes of recession would affect both production 
and consumption. James Hamilton has mentioned exogenous supply shocks coming from political in-
terferences in international oil markets and causing major disturbances in both supply and demand of 
the US car market as a key factor in the development of the Great Recession (Hamilton 2009, 215-267) 
and in the causation of recessions in general (Hamilton 1988, 593). Monetary shocks as those proposed 
by Friedman, oil shocks as those proposed by Hamilton, or other undefined shocks as those proposed 
by RBC authors would hit consumption and production and thus the economy at large. But there is also 
an old radical tradition coming back to Rosa Luxemburg and John A. Hobson, who thought that insuf-
ficiency of purchasing power is a key explanatory element of the cycle, a point of view that was later 
adopted by Marxist authors such as Ernest Mandel, and in the United States by heterodox economists 
like Paul Baran, Paul M. Sweezy and others in the Monthly Review School. Thus increasing inequality 
of income leading to lack of purchasing power, i.e., insufficient aggregate demand, has been suggested 
as a cause of the Great Recession by a number of heterodox economists (Friedman, Moseley, and Sturr 
2009; Foley 2010). In brief, the idea that consumption has a major role in the etiology of the business 
cycle is quite present in modern economics. 
If the role of consumption in the business cycle is disputed, the role of investment is generally agreed 
as a key one. Any cursory examination of economic statistics shows that the main element of aggregate 
demand fluctuating upward during expansions and downward during recessions is investment, while 
consumption varies little between expansion and recession (Sherman and Kolk 1997). Indeed, as Rich-
ard Goodwin once explained, the early efforts in econometric research on the business cycle were the 
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pair of monographs written by Tinbergen in 1939 for the League of Nations. On the basis of general 
agreement among economists, Tinbergen selected investment as the crucial cycle variable to be ex-
plained (Godwin 1964, 417-468).  For Keynes investment responds basically to relative confidence in 
the prospects of businesses, to “animal spirits,” and in that sense is an autonomous variable. In the view 
of Keynes, Kalecki, and the Keynesian school in general, present investment and the level of present 
economic activity are determined by current investment and investment in the near past (Keynes 1936; 
Kalecki 1954; Minsky 2008; Hansen 1964; Matthews 1959).2  
Versus the Keynesian and post Keynesian idea that investment is autonomous, an alternative view is 
that investment depends on profits, so that movements in investment respond to previous movements 
in profitability, an idea that was proposed in the past by a variety of authors (Marx 1977; Veblen 1932; 
Mitchell 1913; Moulton 1949; Tinbergen 1950; Burns 1954).  
Finally, an idea which since long ago has been ground for unending political infighting and for con-
troversies between economists is that by prime-pumping the private economy, government spending is 
able to stabilize the economy and stimulate growth. The idea that government spending has a major 
role in stoking economic growth is an independent hypothesis not directly related with other views on 
mechanisms of the business cycle. However, it is a basic tool in the Keynesian armamentarium and often 
appears coupled with the view that investment is autonomous. As Hyman Minsky colorfully put it,  
investment and government spending call the tune for our economy because they are not determined by how the economy 
is now working. They are determined either from outside by policy (government spending) or by today’s views about the 
future (private investment)” (Minsky 2008) (p. 184). 
 
Thus I will focus on consumption, investment, profits and government spending and I will not exam-
ine data on unemployment rates, wages, exports, imports, debt, interest rates, or money. In the view of 
many authors unemployment rates and wages have a major role in business cycles as factors that may 
influence consumption, profits or the level of output. Either high wages (Pigou 1927, 355; Ohanian 
2008, 10-16) or conditions of almost full or full employment leading to labor shortages that push wages 
up and generate a profit squeeze (Bhaduri and Marglin 1990, 375-393; Boldrin and Horvath 1995, 972-
                                                 
2 Investment is, as Keynes saw it, the causa causans of macroeconomic fluctuations (Keynes 1937, pp. 209-223), 
which depends on “animal spirits,” that is, on psychological factors unrelated with the economy itself. In this 
framework which constitutes a veritable psychological theory of the business cycle, investment seems actually an 
exogenous variable, and the whole scheme should be considered an exogenous theory of the business cycle. But 
this consideration should be put aside for the moment. 
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1004) have been recurrently mentioned as cause of recessions. While in theories of too high wages 
causing recession the causal pathway would be from wages (W) to unemployment (U) to consumption 
(C) and to the economy at large (WUCE), in profit-squeeze theories the influence of low unem-
ployment (U) would force wages up (W), this would cause lower profits (P) which in turn would depress 
the economy at large (E). Thus in the too-high wages theory of recessions the causal path would be 
mediated by consumption (WUCE) while in the profit-squeeze theory it would be mediated by 
profits (UWPE). Though I will not examine here independent effects of unemployment and wages, 
I am examining them indirectly as they are subsumed under the examination of causal paths in which 
consumption and profits are considered potential causes of the business cycle. 
 In spite that many theoretical models of business cycles give great emphasis to monetary forces, I 
will not analyze data on money as part of the general analysis of this paper for several reasons. Econo-
metricians from Tinbergen have found monetary factors rather unimportant in explaining cycles (Tin-
bergen 1939b; Lucas 1977, 7-29; Morgan 1990) and today a consensus seem to exist on the fact that 
monetary disturbances have very little explanatory power to explain recessions in recent decades 
(Knoop 2004). The idea that random variation in monetary policy may account for historical recessions 
has been rejected even in the context of dynamic stochastic equilibrium models (Sims 2012, 1187-1205; 
Sims and Zha 2006, 231-272) and changes in the money supply leading the cycle—as those that were 
highlighted by Friedman and Schwartz and are easy to find in historical data, 
Figure 1. Correlations of the annual rates of growth of M1 (gray dots) and M2 (black dots) with real GDP 
growth in 10-yr windows starting at the year in the horizontal axis 
 
 
Source: Author elaboration from NIPA data. For definitions of series see text. 
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can be explained by mechanisms quite different to those proposed by the monetarists (Sims 2012, 
1187-1205; Tobin 1970, 301-317; Tapia Granados 2014, Nolt 2014 Ch. 5). Indeed for Sims (2010, 59-68) 
at least from the 1950s “most variation in US monetary policy has represented systematic, predictable 
response by the Federal Reserve to the state of the economy.” A further reason to exclude money as a 
major explanatory variable of the business cycle is that the relation between the growth of the money 
indicators M1 and M2 and the growth of the economy has gone through a complete metamorphosis with 
the pass of time. Thus in the 1970s the correlations of real GDP growth with the rates of growth of M1 
and M2 were respectively 0.80 and 0.66, while in 2000-2009 the same correlations were -0.71 and -
0.69 (Figure 1). 
 Exports, imports, debt and interest rates will not be examined here on the assumptions that the US 
economy is a closed system and that credit and credit conditions are not important factors to determine 
the dynamics of macroeconomic fluctuations. Both assumptions are obviously wrong, but it will be as-
sumed here that accepting them is not sufficient to produce major biases and wrong inferences in an 
analysis based on consumption, investment, profits and government spending. 
For testing empirically the causal role of consumption, investment, profits, and government spending 
in the business cycle I use traditional tools of statistics and directed acyclical graphs, DAGs. To a large 
extent DAGs were popularized by the work of Judea Pearl, a computer scientist (Pearl 2000) but they 
are increasingly used in many fields of science (Elwert 2013, 245-272) though to the present, they have 
had a rather marginal use and acceptance in economics (Heckman and Pinto 2015, 115-151). Views by 
Pearl himself on the use of DAGs and causal reasoning in economics were recently published in Econo-
metric Theory (Pearl 2015, 152-179).  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 present the data and descriptive statis-
tics. Section 4 discusses identification, the statistical methods and the results of the analysis are in sec-
tions 5 to 7, and a general discussion of the results is in section 8. Implications for business cycle theory 
are presented in section 9, and section 10 concludes with a forecast.        
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Figure 2. Consumption, domestic investment (gross and business), government expenditure, corporate profits (before 
and after taxes) and taxes on profits. In the top panel series are normalized as percentage of national product. To avoid 
the flattening of all the other series by the plot of consumption which is a much greater percentage of the national product, 
the plot of consumption series has been displaced downward by subtracting 30 percentage points to the original con-
sumption share. In the bottom panel series are in natural logs of billion 1990 dollars. Note that the profit series are broken 
in 1932-1933, as NIPA data for profits are negative for these two years 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author elaboration from NIPA data. For definitions of series see text. 
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2. Data 
I use for the analyses annual statistics of the US economy (Figure 2), available from the National Income 
and Product Accounts (NIPA) for the years 1929-2013 (BEA).3 I use annual and not quarterly data for 
several reasons. First because quarterly data for major components of the national economy are only 
available from 1947, while annual data are available from 1929. Second, annual data allow for the inclu-
sion of a reasonable number of lags in the analysis without the hyperinflation of numerical data and 
results implied by quarterly data. I choose arbitrarily to examine lags for 5 years assuming that events 
that occurred more than 5 years ago are not likely to have an impact on the present condition of the 
economy.4 Applying that assumption to quarterly data would imply examining data for 2o lags. As it will 
be explained, the results of the analysis show that in almost all cases lagged effects beyond 3 years are 
irrelevant. A further reason is that for descriptive and analytical purposes, annual data can be normal-
ized as percentages of the national product without cumbersome seasonal adjustments.5 
As measure of consumption I use personal consumption expenditure (NIPA terminology) and as 
measures of investment I examine both gross private domestic investment and a subset of it, private 
fixed non-residential domestic investment. Gross private domestic investment includes expenditures 
by firms on capital goods such as machinery and buildings, residential expenditures on residential 
structures and equipment, and changes in inventories. Private fixed investment measures spending by 
private businesses, nonprofit institutions, and households on fixed assets, that is, structures, equip-
ment, and intellectual property products that are used in the production of goods and services. Since in 
the NIPA framework residential structures used for housing by individuals or families are viewed as 
businesses, so that a house occupied by her owner is considered as rendering a flow of income to her, 
excluding residential expenditure produces a measure of investment more indicative of the creation or 
improvement of productive assets, or the replacement of worn out or obsolete means of production. In 
                                                 
3 I did most of the analysis with data until 2013, but then the NIPA website included data for 2014 and I used 
them for some analysis.    
4 An unconvincing attempt to prove that even lags of a decade or more have noticeable macroeconomic effects 
can be found in Neftci (1978, 281-291). 
5 I will use gross national product (GNP) and “national product” as equivalent terms. For computation purposes 
I arbitrarily choose GNP as denominator to normalize business-cycle variables. For the 75 year sample 1929-
2013, annual GNP is always greater that GDP, on average 0.6% greater, with the maximum difference in 2011, 
when GNP was 1.6% greater than GDP. Thus all results that I present would be basically identical using GDP to 
normalize the data.  
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other terms, while private fixed non-residential investment is used here as an index of the formation 
of capital and thus the willingness of business and money owners to expand the production capacity, 
gross private domestic investment is also used in the analysis to test the sensitivity of the results to 
measuring investment with a more inclusive measure that comprises expenditure that some authors 
would conceptualize as consumption spending. To avoid using long terms, I abbreviate the NIPA termi-
nology: gross private domestic investment will be here “gross investment” and private fixed non-resi-
dential domestic investment will be “business investment.”  
Corporate profits are reported in NIPA before and after taxes, and since these two categories may be 
differently related to other variables, both are used in the analyses. Profits of all industries are used in 
the main analysis, but NIPA data on corporate profits for domestic industries are used to test the ro-
bustness of results.   
Total government expenditure is reported in NIPA as the aggregate of (a) current expenditure, plus 
(b) gross government investment, plus (c) net purchase of nonproductive assets, plus (d) capital transfer 
payments, minus (d) consumption of fixed capital. However, estimates for the net purchase of nonpro-
ductive assets are available in NIPA from 1960 only, and thus total government expenditure is not re-
ported for the years 1929-1959. I have used as an estimate of overall government expenditure the sum 
of current expenditure and gross government investment, which for the comparable years never exceeds 
the figure of total government expenditure reported in NIPA by more than 12%, with the difference 
mostly attributable to the consumption of fixed capital. To use current expenditure plus gross govern-
ment investment as an indicator of the government contribution to aggregate demand seems to me de-
fensible, as for the creation of demand for goods and services what is important is the total dollar spend-
ing of the government, and not that this spending is or is not substituting obsolete or lost fixed capital. 
 In the statistical analysis I do not use GDP or GNP as aggregates—except to normalize the data. The 
changes in these variables are composed of changes in others. To examine the changes of the compo-
nents themselves illuminates what is often obscured by looking at the aggregate.  
 
3. Descriptive statistics 
Considering NIPA data for 1929-2013, the mean shares in the national product are 63.8% for consump-
tion, 32.0% for government expenditure, 15.4% for gross investment, 10.8% for business investment, 
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9.1% for profits before taxes, 5.9% for profits after taxes, and 3.2% for taxes on corporate profits. The 
“big bills” in NIPA are consumption and government spending, but just a look at their plots (Figure 2) 
indicates that these two variables are much less volatile than the others. Thus the coefficients of varia-
tion are for consumption 9.3%, for government expenditure 23.0%, for gross investment 25.9%, for 
business investment 23.7%, for profits before taxes 26.5% and for profits after taxes 29.3%. The varia-
bility of investment is much greater than the variability of consumption, but profits, particularly profits 
after taxes, are the most volatile variable. 
 It is uncontroversial that in real terms consumption, investment and profits are procyclical, so that 
they fall in recessions, though this is almost impossible to appreciate for consumption when plotted in 
logarithm of real values (Figure 2, bottom panel). However, in terms of share in the national product 
(Figure 2, top panel) consumption declines in expansions and rises in recessions, countercyclically. 
Thus the consumption share soared during the Hoover years of the Great Depression, in the early 1930s, 
as well as during the “Roosevelt recession” of 1938, and during the recession of the mid-1970s. After 
rising quite steadily during the Bush I-Clinton period, and stagnating during the Bush II presidency, 
consumption rose during the Great Recession from 66.8% of the national product in 2007 to 67.3% in 
2010. But in real terms, it shrank—by 2.4%—in 2009 for the first time since the 1930s.  
The procyclical character of business investment is illustrated for instance by its precipitous drop in 
the two recessions of the 1930s, in the recession at the turn of the century and in the Great Recession, 
when the share of business investment in the national product dropped from 13.2% in 2007 to 10.9% in 
2010 (Figure 2). In general, data from recent decades are consistent with what Wesley Mitchell wrote 
six decades ago, that “the cyclical fluctuations in the production of capital goods are four times as violent 
as those in consumer goods” so that investment spending is subject to much greater shocks than con-
sumption spending. “Though capital goods form less than 18% of the gross national product, their out-
put is subject to such violent alternations (...) that this minor segment of the economy contributes 44% 
of the total cyclical fluctuation in output, and nearly half of the cyclical declines” (Mitchell 1951, 153). 
 That profits before and after taxes oscillate procyclically is illustrated for by the peaks of profits in 
1997 and 2006, during the Clinton and Bush’s expansions, and by the troughs of profits coinciding with 
the recessions of the early 1930s, the “Roosevelt recession” of 1938, and the recessions of the mid 1970s 
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and late 1990s. During the Great Recession the share of profits before taxes that had had a peak at 
11.8% in 2010 dropped to 8.6% in 2008.  
Government expenditure is more volatile than consumption, but less than business investment and 
profits. In the long run government expenditure mirroring investment, particularly gross investment 
(Figure 2), illustrates how remarkably spending by the government fluctuates countercyclically, com-
pensating during recessions the lack of demand from the private economy. 
 The three decades following the end of World War II show the minor fluctuations of investment, 
profits and government spending corresponding to the mild business cycles and small recessions of the 
time. Since the 1970s there is however a clear change, as the oscillations grow in amplitude and apparent 
declines in investment and profits mark the recessions in the late 1960s, mid-1970s, early 1980s, early 
1990s, and 2001. According to the NBER chronology, peaks of the US business cycle signaling the start 
of a recession occurred in December 1969, November 1973, January 1980, July 1981, July 1990, March 
2001, and December 2007. Considering the NBER recessions of 1980 and 1981 as a unique one, the 
dates correspond quite well with the declines in profits and investment observable in the late 1960s, 
mid 1970s, early 1980s, early 1990s, and around the turn of the century. The Great Recession is evident 
in the plots as a precipitous decline of gross investment between 2006 and 2009 and business invest-
ment between 2008 and 2010. Corporate profits that had been rising since 2001, reached a peak in 
2006, and then dropped in 2007 and 2008. 
 An issue highlighted by recent debates on income and wealth inequality is whether there have been 
long-term changes that make the distribution of income more unequal. In terms of profits after taxes,  
the best time for owners of capital has been indeed the most recent years, as in 2010–2013 profits after 
taxes reached never-seen-before levels over 9% of national product. Between 1929 and 2014 there were 
indeed only five years in which profits after taxes exceeded 9% of the national product, to know 1929, 
when profits were exactly 9.0% of GNP, and the four years 2010–2013, when profits exceeded each year 
9% of the national product and an all-time high of 9.6% in the share of profits in national product was 
reached in 2013. Between 1929 and 2014 there were only two years in which profits were negative, 1932 
and 1933, when profits after taxes were respectively –1.0% and –1.2% of the national product. 
The share of profits in the national product can be considered a measure of the share of capital returns 
in the national economy. It can be argued that this is an underestimate, as it assumes that all incomes 
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included as wages and salaries in NIPA estimates are part of labor income. Recent reports indicate 
that earnings of CEOs may reach a ratio of 2,238 to 1 compared with the median earnings of the em-
ployees of a company—this was the case with Walt Disney CEO, Robert Iger, in 2014 (Morgenson 2015, 
B1). In NIPA data monumental earnings of this order are conceptualized as salaries, that is, returns on 
labor. Michael Kalecki had the view that salaries of top-level managers, which often also have shares in 
the ownership of the firm, shall be considered profits (Osiatynski 1991, 237, fn. 17), but since NIPA data 
are not accounted following Kalecki’s advice this issue will be fully ignored here. 
Linear trends computed for the whole sample 1929-2013, or for the subsample 1946-2013 which ex-
cludes the turbulences of the 1930s and World War II, show that the long-term trend of profits before 
taxes is sample-dependent, as it has a growing trend in 1929-2013 and a falling trend in 1946-2013 
(Table 1). But the share of profits after taxes in the national product has a clear rising trend in both 
samples, growing between 0.02 and 0.03 percentage points of national product per year and reaching 
an all-time high in 2013. Gross investment has an increasing trend in the long run when the trend is 
computed for the years 1929-2013 (Table 1), but the rising trend clearly depends on the very low values 
during the Great Depression (Figure 1), as the trend computed for 1946-2013 has a slope of 0.013 with 
a standard error of 0.010, i.e., it is indistinguishable from 0. However, business investment reveals a 
significant long-term rising trend whatever sample we choose. 
Table 1. Long-term trends (SE bracketed below the slope estimate) computed as linear models in which the 
share of the variable in the national product is regressed on time (year).  
Variable Sample 1929-2013 
(n = 85) 
Sample 1946-2013 
(n = 67) 
Consumption -0.024 
(0.026) 
0.112*** 
(0.012) 
Gross investment 0.096***  
(0.014) 
0.013  
(0.010) 
Business investment 0.079***  
(0.007) 
0.045***  
(0.007) 
Corporate profits before taxes  0.020†  
(0.010) 
– 0.020*  
(0.010) 
Corporate profits after taxes 0.031***  
(0.007) 
0.024***  
(0.007) 
Taxes on corporate profits – 0.011†  
(0.006) 
– 0.044***  
(0.004) 
Government expenditure 0.184*** 
(0.026) 
0.152*** 
(0.014) 
Computed from NIPA online data, obtained in February-March 2015. *** P < 0.001, * P < 0.05, † P < 0.1.   
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In the period 1929-2013 the annual spending of the government had a minimum of 10.7% of the na-
tional product in 1929 and a maximum of 51.5% in 1944. In the postwar period most of government 
spending is current expenditure, which from levels around 80% in the 1950s rose in recent years to 
comprise about 90% of the government expenditure. A linear trend for government spending using data 
for 1929-2013 has a significant rising trend with a slope of 0.184 with a standard error of 0.026 (P 
<0.001), while for the sample 1946-2013 the positive slope is also very significant and only slightly flat-
ter (0.152 + 0.014). On average, government spending has grown almost 1 percentage point per decade 
in national product units. For illustration of recent controversies on whether the Obama administration 
is spending too much, it may be proper to point out that government profligacy in recent years reached 
its highest in 2009 and 2010, when government expenditures were equivalent to 40.20% and 40.22% 
of the national product, respectively. This level of spending can be considered proper of a war economy, 
as in 1942 the expenditure of the government was 42.4% of the national product (Figure 1), but can be 
hardly considered as an accomplishment of President Obama. Much before the Great Recession, since 
the mid-1970s, annual government spending was at levels oscillating around 35% of the national prod-
uct, which corresponds to World War II levels. Interestingly, and perhaps contrarily to common views, 
government expenditure as a share of the national product rose during the Reagan-Bush years, declined 
during the Clinton era, rose sharply again during the Bush II presidency, and declined again during the 
Obama administration (Figure 2). 
Overall these results demonstrate that in the past eight decades profits after taxes and business in-
vestment are increasing fractions of the national product, corporate taxes are declining, and govern-
ment spending is increasingly large as compared with the size of the national economy. In term of vol-
atility, profits are the most volatile variable, followed by investment.  
 
4. Identification 
A consensual view in economics is the existence of a data-generating process or underlying structure 
which generates the observations. Leamer (2010, 31-46) has recently expressed a skeptical view that 
this data-generating process is just a myth on which the whole edifice of empirical economics rests, but 
for decades economists have interpreted observations in reference to such a data-generating process,  
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Figure 3. DAGs representing potential causal relations between consumption (C), investment (I), government expendi-
ture (G), and profits (P) in three theoretical frameworks. Panels A1 and A2 represent a classical/neoclassical framework in 
which the simplest model (A1) is one of an exogenous business cycle in which G is an exogenous variable modifying C, and 
unknown exogenous “shocks” U to C (e.g. an increase in oil prices due to an OPEC action) will determine changes in C 
which in turn determine changes in I. Profits P are not considered as part of the model. In a more elaborated neoclassical 
view (A2) G can have an effect not only on C, but also on I (“crowding out”) and P. Panels B1 and B1 intend to represent a 
Keynesian frameworks. In the simplest one (B1) I and G are the exogenous variables determining all the other macroeco-
nomic variables (B1). A more elaborated Keynesian view, perhaps a New Keynesian one (B2), may include the assumption 
that G have effects not only on C, but also on I and P, and the causal link goes from C to I rather than the other way around. 
Panels C1 and C2 represent an endogenous model of the business cycle in which G is the only exogenous variable. While I 
depends on past P (C1), present P depends on past I (C2). This framework would correspond roughly with views of Marx, 
Mitchell, and Tinbergen. 
   
              A1                                    A2 
 
 
               B1                        B2             
 
                   C1                       C2 
 
  
   
 
so that a meaningful interpretation of observed data “can be achieved only if there is no other structure 
which is also capable of generating the observed data”; thus identification is the problem “of whether it 
is possible to draw inferences from the probability distribution of the observed variables to an underly-
ing theoretical structure” (Hsiao 1987, 2:714-715). For Malinvaud, “when two or more different struc-
tures imply the same distribution of the observed variables, we say they are not identifiable” (Malinvaud 
1966). Identification has been also defined as deciding whether the estimates “of the parameters of a 
structural equation can be obtained from the estimated reduced-form coefficients” (Gujarati 2003, 
739), or as a particular problem “of applying regression analysis where it is difficult to identify the pre-
cise relationships between variables because all the variables change simultaneously” (Pass et al. 1991, 
68). In discussions on identification in economic texts the word “cause” often seems systematically 
avoided, but the context also suggests that in these discussions “structure,” or “theoretical structure” 
actually means “causal structure,” so that structural equations are equations properly representing 
causal relations between variables, while reduced-form equations represent relations between observed 
variables that can represent real actual relations or just spurious association (Heckman and Pinto 2015, 
115-151). Thus the identification problem is that of solving how to infer actual causal relations (if they 
exist) from observed data. As very clearly interpreted by Elwert, identification determines whether, and 
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under which conditions, it is possible to eliminate all spurious components from an observed associ-
ation, so that “a causal effect is identified if a properly stripped association equals (“identifies”) the 
causal effect” (Elwert 2013, 245-272). 
Figure 4. DAGs representing the potential causal relations between consumption (C), investment (I), profits (P), and gov-
ernment expenditure (G) in  neoclassical (panel A), Keynesian (panel B) and Marx-Mitchell-Tinbergen frameworks (panel 
C) with three periods. In the neoclassical model of panel A, “shocks” to C caused by government actions (G0, G0, G2…) or 
other unknown exogenous factors (U0, U1, U2) will modify I, which in turn will modify C in the next period, C1, which itself 
may be modified by  contemporaneous shocks G1
 
and U1. Since the system itself tends to equilibrium, only exogenous inter-
ferences or “shocks” determine upward or downward deviations of the trajectory of the system, which is determined by 
technological change, population growth, and other factors subsumed under the general category Ui.  In the Keynesian 
framework of panel B, government actions (G0, G0, G2…) will modify C and I, and unknown animal spirits (U0, U1, U2)  will 
modify I, which in turn will modify C in the next period, C1, which itself will be modified by  contemporaneous government 
actions  G1, at the same time that I1  will be modified by U1. Since U1 are exogenous, these spirits cannot be controlled. 
However, steady growth of C can be maintained by monetary and fiscal policy Gi. In the Marx-Mitchell-Tinbergen frame-
work of panel C the business cycle is endogenously generated by the dependency of I from past P, and P from past I. G and 
unknown factors (not represented) are the only exogenous variables, but they do not have a major role in the causation of 
the cycle 
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 The causal relations between business-cycle variables constitute one of the most controversial is-
sues in economics. Focusing on the four basic business-cycle variables I have intended to represent 
through DAGs the explanatory schemes of the business cycle which are hypothesized by different 
schools of economic thought. Of course, after two centuries of heated disputes about what depressions 
or recessions are, and what can be their potential causes, it is not an easy task. Basic rules to draw a 
DAG are that arrows cannot be bidirectional and that there cannot be loops going from one variable to 
itself through other variables. Arrows in DAGs intend to link causes and effects and the whole scheme 
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is strongly imbued by the idea that the cause have to be previous to the effect. Arrows can represent 
positive or negative causality, so the graph G  I can mean both that government expenditure increases 
investment (for instance by creating business opportunities) or that government expenditure reduces 
private business investment (for instance by a mechanism of “crowding out”).   
 Figure 3 intends to represent a DAG depicting the basic causal relations between investment, con-
sumption, profits and government expenditure in the context of classical/neoclassical economics (pan-
els A1 and A2), Keynesian theory (panels B1 and B2) and what I will call Marx-Mitchell-Tinbergen 
framework (panels C1 and C2). Figure 4 intends to present the same causal schemes of Figure 3 in a 
more developed form, using subscripts to represent three consecutive time periods. 
 A comparison of panels A2 and B2 in Figure 3 reveals that the more elaborated versions of the neo-
classical and the New-Keynesian schemes are very similar, they only differs in the shocks U that are 
present in the neoclassical scheme and which can be easily included in the New-Keynesian scheme. The 
comparison of panels across Figure 3 shows how different is the role of profits in the three theoretical 
frameworks. Profits are not even present in the more basic classical/neoclassical framework (Figure 3, 
panel A1), and they are just effects of other variables in the more elaborated version of the neoclassical 
scheme (Figure 3, panel A2, Figure 4, panel A) and in the Keynesian framework (Figure 3, panels B1 
and B2, Figure 4, panel B). However they have a major causal role influencing other variables in the 
Marx-Mitchell-Tinbergen framework (Figure 3, panels C1 and C2, Figure 4, panel C).   
Correlation does not imply causation, but a much more interesting idea, already noticed by John Stu-
art Mill in one of his cannons of causality (Mill 1846) is that the correlation between the changes of two 
variables can be explained only by one causing other or by another variable causing both. In more formal 
terms, the correlation between A and B can be explained only by A causing B (in DAG language AB), 
by B causing A (that is, AB), or by a third variable C. If the correlation between A and B is caused by a 
third variable C, it can be because C is causing both A and B in a situation that has been called “con-
founding” or “causal fork” and is represented with a DAG ACB, where C is the confounder. The other 
possibility that C causes a spurious association between A and B is what is called endogenous selection 
or inverted fork, which corresponds to a structure A  C  B (Elwert 2013, 245-272). Thus in a New-
Keynesian scheme in which C  I  P and C  P (Figure 4, panel B2), I is a confounder of the causal 
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effect C  P and to identify the causal relation C  P the influence of C on P must be stripped of the 
influence of I on both C and P. 
 The virtue of DAG analysis is to produce neat rules on how to ascertain causal relations from observed 
data. Thus if we hypothesize a causal structure such as ABCDE, in which B is a mediator of the 
causal relation between A and C, to adjust for B when assessing the causal relation between A and C will 
be improper as it will “block” the causal path. But if the hypothesized causal structure is C  D  E, and 
we suspect that there might be an unmeasured variable U which is an intermediate link in a causal path 
between C and E, so that , then adjusting for E is a proper strategy in assessing the casual 
relation between C and D. A key element in DAGs is what is not present, which represents all that we 
know or we assume has no effect on the variables represented. So, DAGs presented in figures 4 to 8 all 
of them assume that the money supply, interest rates, imports, exports, meteorological factors, wars in 
Africa or major discoveries in biology do not have an effect on the business cycle in the United States. 
Or if they have it, it is through independent effects on the represented variables.  
The identification strategy of this paper is as follows. I will start from 
scratch by ignoring causal restrictions proposed by different economic theo-
ries, so it will be assumed that all possible causal relations may exist between 
consumption, investment, profits and government expenditure (Figure 5). 
Then, by examining pairwise relations between the four variables, I will elim-
inate the causal pathways that are inconsistent with the statistical associa-
tions revealed by pairwise models. The rationale is that statistical effects of X 
at times t – k on Y at time t can be explained by X causing Y or by another 
variable Z responsible of creating a spurious relation between X and Y by 
confounding or endogenous selection. However, if the statistical effects of X 
at times t – k on Y at time t are null, that is incompatible with a causal effect of A on B. The absence of 
correlation between past values of one variable X and that part of another variable Y which cannot be 
predicted from Y's own past implies absence of causal influence from X to Y (Sims 1972, 540-552). After 
eliminating causal paths that are inconsistent with the associations found in the pairwise analysis, I will 
test the remaining potential causal path by adjusting for variables that can create spurious associations.   
Figure 5. All potential 
causal relations between 
consumption (C), invest-
ment (I), government ex-
penditure (G) and profits 
(P) abstracting from re-
strictions proposed by dif-
ferent economic theories. 
Note that this scheme is 
not a DAG as it includes bi-
directional arrows   
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5. Statistical methods 
To obtain mean-stationary and variance-stationary time series that allows for statistical testing I used 
two methods. First, series in real values (2009 dollars) were log-transformed and then converted into 
first differences, which amounts to using variables in rate of growth. Second, series were converted into 
percentages of the national product, and then differenced.  
 I assume that the structural functions linking the variables are approximately linear—if they exist—
and use distributed-lag regressions to examine the associations between changes in a explanatory vari-
able or covariate at years t – k and changes in a dependent variable at year t. For instance, I regress the 
change in profits on the change in investment to ascertain potential associations between past invest-
ment and present profits. The regression equation is   
,
1 t
r
k ktkt
IP       
where  
Pt is a given category of profits,  
It is a given measure of investment, 
Δ is the difference operator so that ΔXt is the change of the variable X between year t–1 and year t, and 
εt is the error term. 
 Equations were estimated for specifications in which r, the number of lag terms of the explanatory 
variable, varied from 1 to 5. The criterion to choose among these five equations the equation with the 
best fit is to minimize AIC, the Akaike information criterion. If the AIC was minimized by the equation 
including five lags, I computed an equation including one extra lag to check if AIC was lower including 
six lags, which never occurred. 
 To avoid imposing unwarranted assumptions on the models I did not use Almon lags.       
To make specifications with different lags comparable in terms of AIC the sample has to include ex-
actly the same number of observations. Thus in the specification for the whole sample the observations 
used were actually those corresponding to the years 1934 to 2013, so that for all the sample data are 
available for any variable lagged up to 5 years. 
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 To examine the robustness of the results to sample selection, I computed regression models for the 
whole sample 1934-2013 and for three subsamples: 1934-1960, 1961-1990, and 1991-2013.  
Table 2. Correlations at lag 0. In the top panel variables are in first differences of the share in the national prod-
uct. In the bottom  panel variables are first differences of logs of real values in 2009 dollars 
 Gross  in-
vestment 
Profit after 
taxes 
Profit be-
fore taxes 
Taxes on 
profits 
Government 
expenditure 
 
Consumption 
Business investment 0.80***  0.34**  0.27*  -0.01 –0.78***   0.28 
Gross investment  0.48***       0.51***      0.26* –0.79***   0.16 
Profits after taxes   0.89***      0.16 –0.19† –0.28** 
Profits before taxes    0.60*** –0.09 –0.49*** 
Taxes on profits        0.14 –0.56*** 
Government expend.      –0.69*** 
Business investment 0.87***  0.40***  0.40***  0.33** –0.48***   0.74*** 
Gross investment  0.43***       0.45***      0.41*** –0.46***   0.70*** 
Profits after taxes   0.93***      0.56***   0.01  0.50*** 
Profits before taxes    0.81***   0.15  0.58*** 
Taxes on profits        0.28**  0.56*** 
Government expend.       0.49*** 
*** P < 0.001, ** P < 0.01, * P < 0.05, † P < 0.1.     
 
 Models to test the pairwise association between variables exclude a contemporaneous effect in which 
the explanatory variable at year 0 would modify the dependent variable at year 0. This is because the 
purpose of the models is to look for associations that are potentially causal. Statistically significant as-
sociations of a variable x on a variable y at lag 0 can be explained by x causing y, by y causing x, by both 
causing each other, or by a third variable causing both. However, a change of x at time -1 followed by a 
change in y at time 0 can be an effect of x on y or an effect of a third variable on both, but never an effect 
of y on x, unless we disregard all rational notions of causality or assume human beings with supernatu-
ral abilities to forecast the future, and adjust their actions to make the forecast true. Indeed, since the 
business cycle implies more or less simultaneous oscillations of the different components of the national 
economy, the oscillations of many series at lag 0 are highly correlated but they tell us nothing about 
what can be causing what. Series of profits and investment in first differences have very high and sta-
tistically significant positive correlations (Table 2). Because they are both strongly procyclical, changes 
in profits before taxes and changes in gross investment have a very significant positive correlation (0.51 
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as shares of GNP, 0.49 as log real values, both P < 0.001), but government expenditure has very large 
negative correlations with investment, revealing its countercyclical fluctuation. 
 Omitting contemporaneous effects and focusing on models in which what happens at the present is 
modeled on what happened in past years facilitates establishing what covariates have an explanatory 
power of the changes in the variable used as dependent. 
 
6. Pairwise associations 
I examined pairwise associations by computing regression models in which present values of the de-
pendent variable are a function of lag values of the covariate. Since autocorrelation of the residuals can 
be a reason for underestimated standard errors and spurious statistical significance, I systematically 
examined the Durbin-Watson d. In models computed with first differences of log-transformed  
real values d is usually in a 
range between 1.5 and 2.0, 
though in particular regres-
sions it went down to the range 
1.0 to 1.5. In regressions with 
data in first differences of 
shares in the national product, 
d was usually quite close to 2.0. 
Since d is approximately equal 
to 2 (1 − r), where r is the sam-
ple autocorrelation of the re-
siduals, d in the range 1.5 to 2 
indicates r in a range between 
0.0 and 0.25, that is a quite 
small positive autocorrelation 
of the residuals. So the re-
duced-form equations to ascer-
tain pairwise associations seem to have estimated standard errors unaffected by underestimation due 
Table 3. Associations of lag consumption with present business invest-
ment 
Sample Lag Eq. 1 Eq. 2 Eq. 3 Eq. 4 Eq. 5 
1934-2013 1 2.07*** 2.2*** 2.04*** 2.11*** 2.16*** 
 2  -0.81 -0.51 -0.48 -0.38 
 3   -0.74 -0.83 -0.86† 
 4    0.22 -0.01 
 5     0.52 
 AIC -354.4 -354.8 -355.5 -353.8 -353.1 
 R2 0.15 0.18 0.21 0.21 0.22 
1934-1960 1 2.20† 2.16† 1.90 2.21 2.38 
 2  -0.65 -0.35 -0.23 -0.01 
 3   -0.83 -1.05 -1.13 
 4    0.54 0.24 
 5     0.73 
 AIC -90.3 -88.6 -87.6 -86.0 -84.8 
 R2 0.12 0.13 0.16 0.17 0.20 
1961-1990 1 1.82*** 2.17*** 2.13*** 2.13*** 2.15*** 
 2  -1.15* -1.11† -1.25* -1.23* 
 3   -0.15 0.01 0.10 
 4    -0.51 -0.64 
 5     0.41 
 AIC -180.6 -183.8 -181.9 -181.1 -180.0 
 R2 0.29 0.41 0.41 0.43 0.45 
1991-2013 1 1.55† 2.11*     2.09*    2.08* 2.19* 
 2  -1.29 -0.72 -0.73 -0.89 
 3   -1.26 -0.99 -0.95 
 4    -0.58 -0.19 
 5     -0.93 
 AIC -126.4 -126.9 -127.8 -126.4 -125.1 
 R2 0.16 0.25 0.33 0.35 0.37 
All variables in the regressions are first differences of log-transformed real 
values in 2009 dollars. 
*** P < 0.001, ** P < 0.01, * P < 0.05, † P < 0.1.   
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to positive autocorrelation of the residuals.    
6.1. Consumption      
6.1.1. Consumption “causing” investment (CI) 
Models in which lag consumption is used as explanatory variable of present business investment (Table 
3) provide sample-dependent results that are rather inconclusive as the associations of past consump-
tion with present investment. The model with the best fit for the sample 1934-2013 is equation 3 (Table 
3, first panel) including effects for lags 1 to 3: 
ΔCt = 0.02 + 2.04 ΔIt-1 – 0.51 ΔIt-2 – 0.74 ΔIt-3+εt 
         (0.03)  (0.56)          (0.55)        (0.46)                                                                 R2 = 0.21. 
 
In this model there is a highly significant positive association of consumption at lag 1 with investment 
at lag 0 but the associations are negative, though not significant, at lags 2 and 3. The net association is  
positive and the model explains 21% of the variation of 
investment. In the sample 1934-1960 the association of 
past consumption with present investment in the speci-
fication with the best fit is positive but only marginally 
significant and R2 is only 0.12. In the sample 1961-1990 
there are alternate positive and negative signs of the as-
sociation of past consumption—at lags 1 and 2—with 
present investment, though the net association is posi-
tive. In the sample 1991-2013 the model with the best fit 
has respectively positive and negative association of past 
consumption at lags 1 to 3 with present investment, with 
a net positive association (2.09–0.72–1.26 =0.11) close to 0.  
 Using gross investment as dependent variable (results not shown), the models with the best fit reveal 
in the whole sample statistically significant positive and negative associations of past consumption at 
lags 1 and 2 with present investment, but past consumption has no significant association with present 
investment in the samples 1934-1960 and 1991-2013 and it has only a very small positive net association 
in 1961-1990.  
Table 4. Associations of lag consumption with 
present profits (after taxes and before taxes). 
Only the results of the model with the best fit 
(lowest AIC) are presented 
 Sample Lag 
After  
taxes  
Before 
taxes 
1934–2013 1 – 1.12 – 0.47 
 2 – 1.30† – 1.12 
 3 – 0.94 – 1.75*** 
 4 – 1.04  
R2  0.17 0.17 
1934–1960 1 – 1.87 – 1.06 
 2 – 1.51 – 1.20 
 3 – 1.16 – 2.26* 
 4 – 1.50  
R2  0.27 0.25 
1961–1990 1 – 0.54     0.55 
 2 – 3.03* – 2.66* 
R2  0.20 0.18 
1991–2013 1 – 1.96 – 1.96 
R2  0.10 0.11 
All variables are first differences of log-trans-
formed real values in 2009 dollars 
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Overall these regressions provide some evidence of an unconditioned positive association of past 
consumption with present investment, but the evidence is weak and inconsistent. 
6.1.2. Consumption “causing” government expenditure (C G) 
Results of regressions with consumption being the explanatory variable of government expenditure (not 
shown) do not reveal significant associations in the samples 1934-2013 and 1934-1960, in which the 
models with the best fit have R2 values of 0.01 and 0.04. In the sample 1961-1990 lag consumption have 
significant associations (– 0.15 and 0.57) with present government expenditure at lags 1 and 2, with an 
R2 of 0.24, while in the sample 1991-2013 the model with the best fit includes a negative association at 
lag 1 and positive associations at lags 2 to 5, with an R2 of o.64. Overall these results suggest a positive 
association in recent decades, so that changes in consumption are followed a few years later by changes 
in government expenditure in the same direction. 
6.1.3. Consumption “causing” profits (CP) 
Regression results provide strong evidence that the unconditioned association of past consumption with 
present profits is negative (Table 4). Effect estimates are systematically negative (and many of them 
significant) in all samples and both when using as dependent variable profits before taxes and profits 
after taxes. This is solid evidence that movements in consumption are followed by movements in profits 
in the opposite direction in the next few years. 
6.2. Investment 
6.2.1. Investment “causing” consumption (I C) 
Results of regressions with business investment as covariate 
and consumption as dependent show that past investment has 
rather weak associations with present consumption (Table 5). 
But the associations, revealed in regressions by significant pa-
rameter estimates with alternate signs, are overall negative, so 
that movements of investment are followed by movements of 
consumption in the opposite direction. For instance in the sam-
ple 1934-1960 and using business investment as covariate, the 
Table 5. Associations of lag investment 
with present consumption 
Sample Lag Effect estimate 
1934-2013 1 -0.04† 
 2 -0.01 
 3 -0.05* 
 R2 0.12 
1934-1960 1 -0.07* 
 2 0.00 
 3 -0.08*** 
 R2 0.40 
1961-1990 1 -0.05 
 2 -0.10† 
 R2 0.15 
1991-2013 1 0.05 
 R2 0.04 
All variables in the regressions are first dif-
ferences of log-transformed real values in 
2009 dollars. 
*** P<0.001, ** P<0.01, * P<0.05, † P<0.1. 
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model with the best fit has estimates of –0.07, +0.00, and –0.08 (of which the first and the last esti-
mates are highly significant) for the effects of investment on consumption at lags 1 to 3, and the model 
predicts a substantial 40% of the variation in consumption. In the sample 1991-2013 the association of 
past investment with present consumption is positive, but it is statistically insignificant with an R2 of 
0.04. Using gross investment rather than business investment the results are quite similar. Overall the 
results are quite inconsistent with the view that investment raises consumption in future years and it 
seems the unconditioned association between past investment and present consumption must be con-
sidered either negative or null. 
6.2.2. Investment “causing” profits (IP) 
Using business investment as covariate and profits after taxes as 
dependent variable (Table 6), the model with the best fit for the 
sample 1934-2013 shows negative associations of investment at 
lags 1 to 4 with present profits, with a significant negative effect es-
timate at lag 1. In the sample 1934-1960, investment has a non-sig-
nificant negative association with profits at lag 1 in the model with 
the best fit, but in the samples 1961-1990 and 1991-2013 the asso-
ciation of investment at lags 1 and 2 with present profits is negative 
and significant. The general pattern (Table 6) is one of a negative 
association of past investment with present profits.  
Using as dependent variable profits before taxes instead of prof-
its after taxes, or using gross investment as explanatory variable, the results (not shown) are basically 
the same and even in some cases more supportive of a negative association of past investment with 
future profits. Thus in the sample 1991-2013, in the model with the best fit in which the net association 
of past investment at lags 1 to 3 with present profits is negative, business investment explains 49% of 
the variation of profits before taxes. 
Overall these results show an unconditioned negative association of present investment with future 
profits. Movements in investment are followed by movements in profits in the opposite direction.  
6.2.3. Investment “causing” government expenditure (I G) 
Table 6. Associations of lag busi-
ness investment with present prof-
its after taxes. Only the results of 
the model with the best fit are pre-
sented 
 Sample Lag 
Effect esti-
mate  
1934-2013 1 -0.33* 
 2 -0.16 
 3 -0.02 
 4 -0.16 
 5 -0.37*** 
R2  0.18 
1934-1960 1 -0.09 
R2  0.01 
1961-1990 1 -0.95* 
 2 -0.60 
R2  0.31 
1991-2013 1 -0.77* 
R2  0.25 
All variables in the regressions are 
first differences of log-trans-
formed real values in 2009 dollars. 
*** P < 0.001, ** P < 0.01,  
* P < 0.05, † P < 0.1. 
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Regressions of present government spending on past investment (Table 7) show sample-dependent 
associations. The net association of past investment (using either business investment or gross invest-
ment) and present government expenditure is negative in the samples 1934-2013 and 1934-1960, but 
positive in 1961-1990 and 1991-2013. Only in the sample 1991-2013 investment has a substantial ability 
to predict government spending (R2 is 0.43 with business investment and 0.62 with gross investment), 
with effect estimates having opposing signs that overall yield a small positive net effect. In regressions 
with first differences of shares of the national product (not shown) in the subsample 1991-2013 a per-
centage point increase in the share of gross investment is followed one year later by a highly significant 
decrease of 0.58 percentage points in government expenditure, with the change in investment explain-
ing a substantial 36% of the change in government spending. 
Table 7. Associations of lag investment with present government expenditure. Only the models with 
the best fit are presented    
  
Lag 
 Sample 
1934-2013 
Sample 
1934-1960 
Sample 
1961-1990 
Sample  
1991-2013 
Panel A 
Business   investment 
explaining government 
expenditure 
1  – 0.28* –0.40* 0.08 – 0.11 
2     0.16***    0.13† 
3         0.04 
4         0.09 
5      
R2   0.06  0.10 0.34  0.43 
      
Panel B. 
Gross investment ex-
plaining government 
expenditure 
1  – 0.07 – 0.11 0.02 – 0.09* 
2     0.09  0.08*    0.05 
3     0.11†      0.08* 
4        0.04 
5        0.10 
R2  0.05 0.03 0.16 0.62 
*** P < 0.001, ** P < 0.01, * P < 0.05, † P < 0.1.   
Variables are in first differences of log-transformed real values in 2009 dollars   
 
Considering all the results, it seems the unconditioned between past investment and present govern-
ment expenditure is moderately positive, so that an upturn in private investment is associated with an 
immediate downturn in government spending the same year and the next year, but then an increase in 
government spending follows in the next few years. This seems consistent with the fact that during the 
Reagan-Bush I period and also during the Bush II presidency, government expenditure rose when the 
overall economy, as proxied by private investment, had been expanding for a while. At any rate, the fact 
that government spending has significant associations with lagged investment shows that rather than 
as an endogenous variable, government spending shall be treated as an endogenous one—as Christo-
pher Sims emphasized in his Nobel lecture (Sims 2012, 1187-1205).        
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6.3. Government expenditure 
6.3.1. Government expenditure “causing” consumption (G C) 
Models in which consumption is the covariate and government expenditure the dependent variable (re-
sults not shown) do not reveal any significant association and the highest R2 found in these models is 
0.07. In the sample 1934-2013 the model with the best fit shows statistically significant positive associ-
ations of government expenditure at lags 1 and 5 with consumption at lag 0, but the R2 of the model is 
only 0.18. Overall the results of the models seems consistent with a null unconditioned association be-
tween lag government expenditure and present consumption which is inconsistent with a causal effect 
G  C. 
6.3.2. Government expenditure “causing” investment (G I) 
Results of lag regressions in which past government expenditure is used to explain business investment 
or gross investment (Table 8) show sample-dependent results. If greater levels of government spending 
would contribute to stimulate the private economy, we would expect positive associations of business 
investment with lag government expenditure. However, for instance in the 1991-2013 the association of 
past government expenditure with business investment is negative and significant (Table 8, panel A). 
In the sample 1991-2013 the power of government spending to predict business investment is basically 
null and in the samples 1934-2013 and 1934-1960 past government expenditure explains about a quar-
ter of the variation in business investment, but the effect estimates at lags 1 to 3 have opposing signs, 
with a net effect small and positive. Using as dependent variable gross investment (Table 8, panel B), 
government explaining explains basically nothing in the subsamples and has effects with opposing signs 
with a net effect almost zero in the general sample. 
Table 8. Associations of lag government expenditure with business investment, or gross investment. Only the 
models with the best fit are presented    
  
Lag 
 Sample 
1934-2013 
Sample  
1934-1960 
Sample 
1961-1990 
Sample  
1991-2013 
Panel A 
Government expenditure ex-
plaining business investment 
1  – 0.34*** – 0.35* – 0.29 – 1.67* 
2     0.15    0.14    
3     0.25*    0.24   
R2   0.23  0.28  0.01  0.21 
Panel B  
Government expenditure ex-
plaining gross investment 
1  – 0.32† – 0.41 0.61 – 1.54 
2  – 0.19    
3     0.53***    
R2  0.15  0.09 0.02 0.10 
*** P < 0.001, ** P < 0.01, * P < 0.05, † P < 0.1. 
Variables are in first differences of log-transformed real values in 2009 dollars. 
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  Overall these results seem quite inconsistent with the hypothesis that an increase in government 
spending will pump-prime the economy by raising private investment in the following years. Results 
like the negative significant association of government spending at lag 1 with business investment at lag 
zero in the sample 1991-2013 do not allow to discard a potential causal effect G  I, but on face value 
the association is negative rather than positive.  
6.3.3. Government expenditure “causing” profits (G  P) 
Regressions of present profits (either before or after taxes) 
on lag values of government spending show that lag gov-
ernment spending has no ability at all to explain present 
profits. Effect estimates in all samples are erratic in sign 
but always insignificant; R2 values are below 0.6. Thus 
GP must be considered null. 
6.4. Profits 
6.4.1. Profits “causing” investment (PI) 
Results of regressions in which lag profits are used to ex-
plain present investment show a net positive association 
(Table 9). In general, profits before taxes have a greater 
explanatory power of investment than profits after taxes. 
Thus in the sample 1961-1990 the association is concen-
trated at lag 1, with profits after and before taxes explaining respectively 38% and 44% of the variation 
in investment, while in the sample 1991-2013 the association is spread at more lags, but now profits 
after and before taxes explain respectively 57% and 62% of the variation in business investment. 
 Using gross investment rather than business investment, the results (not shown) are quite similar in 
all samples. Overall, the results of all these models, excepting some for the subsample 1934-1960, are 
indicative of a positive association of past profits with present investment, that is, a movement in profits 
predicting a movement in investment in the same direction in the next few years.  
6.4.2. Profits “causing” government expenditure (P G) 
Table 9. Associations of lag profits (either 
after taxes or after taxes) with present busi-
ness investment. Only the results of the 
model with the best fit are presented 
 Sample Lag 
After 
taxes  
Before  
taxes 
1934-2013 1 0.11  0.01 
 2  -0.05 
 3  -0.05 
 4   0.20* 
 5   0.19* 
R2  0.02 0.22 
1934-1960 1 -0.30 -0.33* 
 2 -0.01 -0.08 
 3 -0.44† -0.15 
 4 0.37  0.33* 
 5   0.29* 
R2  0.32 0.65 
1961-1990 1 0.28***  0.36*** 
R2  0.38 0.44 
1991-2013 1 0.26*  0.35*** 
 2 0.32***  0.27*** 
 3 0.12  
 4 0.14  
R2  0.57 0.62 
*** P < 0.001, ** P < 0.01, * P < 0.05, † P < 
0.1. 
All variables are first differences of log-trans-
formed real values in 2009 dollars 
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Regressions in which present profits are used as explanatory variable of future government expendi-
ture reveal overall a positive association (results not shown). However, the association (with R2 of just 
0.11 for the whole sample), which is strongest in the subsample 1934-1960 (R2 = 0. 38), is positive in 
this subsample as well as in the subsample 1961-1990 (R2 =0.14) but in the subsample 1991-2013 the 
association appears in the model with the best fit at lags 1 and 2, and is negative in both cases (R2 = 0.23). 
Though the sign of the association PG seems unclear, it seems the evidence does not allow to exclude 
it from a multivariate analysis. But again, the results are consistent with Sims’s views on the endogeneity 
of government spending (Sims 2012, 1187-1205). 
6.4.3. Profits “causing” consumption (P C) 
Regressions results (not shown) indicate positive and significant associations in the general sample and 
in the subsamples 1961-1990 and 1991-2013, where the variation in profits after taxes explains respec-
tively 5%, 24%, and 13% of the variation in consumption. In the subsample 1934-1960 the association 
is null. Overall, past profits show a clear though rather weak positive association with present consump-
tion.   
 
6.5. Robustness checks 
On average, for the 86 year period 1929-2014, corporate profits before taxes of domestic industries are 
90.2% of all corporate profits before taxes, and for the 85 year period 1929-2013, corporate profits after 
taxes of domestic industries are on average 85.4% of all corporate profits after taxes. The greatest dif-
ferences are observed in the past decade, when profits before taxes of domestic industries oscillated year 
to year around 70% to 80% of all corporate profits before taxes (the minimum, 68.4%, corresponds to 
2008). For profits after taxes the share of domestic industries also reaches minimum levels during the 
past decade, with the minimum in 2008 when domestic profits after taxes are only 58.3% of all profits 
after taxes. I used corporate profits of domestic industries for robustness check of the main results ob-
tained with corporate profits of all industries. Using corporate profits of domestic industries—before or 
after taxes—in the regression models instead of profits of all industries, the results (not shown) are very 
similar to those presented here (in Tables 6 and 9). Almost constantly the best specification in terms of 
number of lags that minimizes AIC is the same using total profits or profits of domestic industries. 
However, in some models the change in profits of domestic industries predicts the change in business 
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investment better, and sometimes much better, than total profits. Thus for the sample 1991-2013 total 
profits after taxes explain 57% of the variation in business investment (Table 9) while profits after taxes 
of domestic industries explain 72%. 
As it was mentioned, the category of “business investment” that I have used throughout this paper is 
actually what in NIPA tables appears as gross private domestic nonresidential fixed investment. To 
check how sensitive the regression results are to a change in the category of investment, I computed 
equations using the category that appears in NIPA as “private domestic investment of businesses,” 
which is only available for 1960-2013. The results (not shown) differ very little from the results for the 
category of “business investment” used here. I also estimated some regressions using as measure of 
investment a net investment variable computed as gross domestic investment minus consumption of 
fixed capital minus gross government investment. The results were also not very different to those pre-
sented here. 
I tested the sensitivity of the results to including lag-0 effects in the regressions. The lag-0 effect is 
positive and very significant both for investment “causing” profits and for profits “causing” investment 
and for many other pairwise associations, as it is to be expected given the lag-0 strong correlation be-
tween business-cycle variables (Table 2). The other lagged-effect estimates change moderately in mag-
nitude when the lag-0 effect is included in the model, but they do not change in sign and are substan-
tially similar to the effects reported in the tables of this paper. 
 
7. Multivariate associations  
Once hypothetical causal paths which are incompatible with the result of the 
pairwise analysis are eliminated, the possible causal paths between the four busi-
ness-cycle variables are reduced to those shown in Figure 6. Since only effects of 
government expenditure on consumption and profits are fully inconsistent with 
the pairwise associations, the functional form of structural equations linking the 
four variables should be as follows: 
C = fC (I, P) 
I = fI (C, G, P) 
P = fP (C, I) 
Figure 6. Potential 
causal pathways after 
eliminating those in-
consistent with the 
pairwise associations 
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G = fG (C, I, P). 
Estimating these models for the lags and combination of variables that produce the best fit, the fol-
lowing equations are obtained (standard errors bracketed below parameter estimates, error term omit-
ted):6 
Estimated equation                                                                                                                Sample R2 
ΔCt = 0.02+0.12 ΔIt-1+0.06ΔPt-1 
         (0.00) (0.05)           (0.02)                                                                                                                           1991-2014 
 
0.34 
ΔCt = 0.04–0.22 ΔIt-1+0.08ΔPt-1+0.06ΔPt-2 
         (0.00) (0.05)          (0.01)       (0.02)                                                                                                          1961-1990 
 
0.62 
ΔCt = 0.04—0.06 ΔIt-1+0.01 ΔIt-2–0.06 ΔIt-3+0.04ΔPt-1 
         (0.00) (0.02)           (0.02)       (0.02)        (0.01)                                                                                     1934-2014 
 
0.20 
  
ΔIt = –0.01 + 1.84 ΔCt-1 +0.24ΔPt-1– 1.12 ΔGt-1  
          (0.03)  (0.59)              (0.06)         (0.49)                                                                                                  1991-2014 
 
0.61 
ΔIt =   0.04 + 1.13 ΔCt-1 +0.15 ΔPt-1  
          (0.01)  (0.57)              (0.06)                                                                                                                       1961-1990 
 
0.33 
ΔIt=–0.05+1.70ΔCt-1-0.10ΔCt-2-1.09ΔCt-3+0.62ΔCt-4+1.15ΔCt-5+0.06ΔPt-1 +0.01ΔPt-2+0.02ΔPt-3+ 0.20ΔPt-4 
          (0.04)  (0.57)   (0.60)         (0.58)        (0.58)        (0.53)        (0.08)       (0.08)        (0.07)         (0.07) 
                                                                                                                                                                                   1934-2014 
 
 
0.30 
  
ΔPt = – 0.08 – 1.22 ΔIt-1 
              (0.03)  (0.47)                                                                                                                                            1991-2014 
 
0.23 
ΔPt = – 0.08 – 1.40 ΔIt-1 
              (0.03)  (0.44)                                                                                                                                           1961-1990 
 
0.26 
ΔPt = – 0.15 –0.44ΔCt-1–0.24ΔCt-2-2.66ΔCt-3– 0.27 ΔIt-1+ 0.10ΔIt-2+ 0.47 ΔIt-3 
            (0.05)  (1.29           (1.31)         (1.08)          (0.25)        (0.28)        (0.24)                                          1934-2014 
 
0.17 
  
ΔGt = 0.03–0.16 ΔIt-1 – 0.06ΔPt-1   
         (0.00) (0.06)          (0.02)                                                                                                                            1991-2014 
 
0.33 
ΔGt = 0.04–0.12 ΔIt-1   
         (0.00) (0.06)                                                                                                                                                 1961-1990 
 
0.12 
ΔGt = 0.06–0.29 ΔIt-1  
         (0.00) (0.06)                                                                                                                                                 1934-2014 
 
0.07 
 
For many reasons the parameter estimates including the years of World War II look like less reliable 
than the estimates from the other samples. Assuming then than the “true parameters” are those esti-
mated for the most recent sample 1991-2014, which are very similar to those estimated for 1961-1990, 
we obtain the following system of equations:   
ΔCt =   0.02 + 0.12 ΔIt-1+ 0.16 ΔPt-1                                                                                                         [1] 
ΔIt = – 0.01 + 1.84 ΔCt-1 + 0.24 ΔPt-1 – 1.12 ΔGt-1                                                                                 [2] 
ΔPt = – 0.08 – 1.22 ΔIt-1                                                                                                                            [3] 
ΔGt =  0.03 – 0.16 ΔIt-1 – 0.06 ΔPt-1                                                                                                         [4] 
  
                                                 
6 These equations have been estimated using business investment as measure of investment and profits after 
taxes of domestic industries as measure of profits, with log-transformed real values of variables in 2009 dollars. 
 30 
 By elimination of variables through recursive substitution, the system of 
equations [1] to [4] can be simplified for instance to ΔIt = –0.03 – 0.82 ΔIt-2 – 
0.21 ΔIt-3 , an equation that  produces dampened oscillations for any initial val-
ues. 
Assuming these equations are structural and represent causal effects, we have 
the following relations: 
 consumption is a positive function of lag investment and lag profits (con-
firmation of pairwise associations); 
 investment is a positive function of lag consumption and lag profits, and a negative function of 
government expenditure (confirmation of pairwise associations); 
 profits are a negative function of lag invest-
ment (the unconditioned association of lag 
consumption with profits is not confirmed in 
the multivariate analysis); and 
 government expenditure is a negative func-
tion of lag investment and lag profits (the 
unconditioned association of lag consump-
tion with government spending is not sup-
ported in the multivariate analysis). 
The graph corresponding to these associations is 
Figure 7, in which Figure 6 has lost the CG link, 
and the link between C and P which was bidirec-
tional is now P  C. Still this is not a DAG as there 
are bidirectional arrows. Figure 8 is an attempt to 
build a DAG depicting the causal relations repre-
sented by equations [1] to [4]. Though the result-
ing scheme includes causal links I P and PI that are more consistent with the Marx-Mitchell-Tin-
bergen scheme, the complete model is much more complex than any of the models represented in 
Figures 3 and 4. 
Figure 7. Potential 
causal pathways after 
eliminating those in-
consistent with the 
multivariate models 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. DAG representing the potential causal relations 
between consumption (C), investment (I), profits (P) and 
government expenditure (G) in a model derived of observed 
pairwise and multivariate associations 
 
 31 
 But are equations [1] to [4] properly identified? Are they “structural”, that is, causal equations? Do 
they reflect causal effects or just spurious associations? Of course, the inference that these associations 
reflect causal effects holds as far as assumptions used to arrive at them are correct. It is always possible 
the existence of omitted variables that generate spurious correlations among observed variables. But 
claiming that the existence of an omitted variable is the reason explaining observed association between 
two variables like those in equations [1] to [4] is an empty claim if there is no concrete indication of 
which one could be the omitted variable. Otherwise it will be like the supposed gene that according to 
some interested parties causes both lung cancer and a propensity to smoke.  
Causal dependencies derived from equations [1] and [2] are that consumption is a positive function 
of lag investment and lag profits, and that investment is a positive function of lag consumption. These 
are relatively uncontroversial ideas in economics though, of course, a positive dependency of investment 
on lag consumption is not consistent with the neoclassical view that higher levels of saving, which imply 
less consumption, lead to higher levels of investment or capital formation. More controversial may be 
the idea that that investment is a positive function of lag profits and a negative function of government 
expenditure, also derived from equation [2]. Even more controversial may be the idea that profits are a 
negative function of lag investment or that government expenditure is a negative function of lag invest-
ment and lag profits, causal dependencies derived from equations [3] and [4].  
I checked the possibility that any of the excluded variables may be an omitted variable whose omission 
is creating a spurious “causal” association. For instance it could be that a causal structure  
or even I  MP in which money is a confounder of the relation between I and P is creating a biased or 
totally spurious association between I and P (in which case the graph IP shall be removed from the 
DAG). To consider this and similar possibilities I checked that the effect estimate of investment on prof-
its is always negative even adding to the regression model lag terms for the growth of either consump-
tion, government expenditure, money (M1 or M2) or any combination of these. Though the parameter 
estimate of the statistical effect of investment on profits changes indeed when other covariates are added 
to the model—though never very much, always less than say by a third—the effect remains always neg-
ative. The shrinking effect of government spending on business investment will be also a puzzling idea 
for Keynesians, so I checked how the parameter estimate varies with the inclusion in the model of terms 
 32 
for M1, or M2, or with the exclusion of consumption or profits: the effect estimate of government 
spending on investment remains always negative. It seems therefore that the sign of these negative ef-
fects—of investment on profits and of government spending on business investment—is properly iden-
tified.   
 
8. Discussion    
I reviewed elsewhere how causes of business cycles have been conceptualized in economic thought and 
examined the relation between investment and profits in quarterly data of the US economy. Results 
showed that profits Granger-cause investment and that profits have a significant positive association 
with future investment in the next few quarters; however, I did not find significant effects of past in-
vestment on present profits (Tapia Granados 2013, 229-259). The comparison of those results with the 
results of the present investigation with annual data confirms the stimulating effect of profits on invest-
ment, which is revealed in the analysis of both annual and quarterly series; but the comparison also 
shows that the analysis with annual data reveals a significant negative effect of lagged investment on 
present profits which does not appear in the analysis of quarterly data, in which lagged investment 
mostly shows no significant effect on present profits. Disaggregation often is an appropriate tool to en-
hance statistical power, but also raises statistical noise and may blur effects, making them undetectable. 
 The negative effects shown in this investigation—of investment on profits and government spending 
on profits—are quite inconsistent with Keynesian views. The Keynesian idea that investment “calls the 
tune” is not supported by the evidence presented here. Investment is not autonomous and indeed is the 
variable that is better explained by the endogenous model of the business cycle embodied in equations 
[1] to [4] of the former page. Rather than guided by unobservable animal spirits, investment appears 
guided by changes in consumption, profits and even government spending.  
The Keynesian view that government expenditure may pump-prime the economy by stimulating pri-
vate investment is also inconsistent with the finding that the net effect of lagged government expending 
on private investment is null or even significantly negative in recent decades. In the 1991-2014 sample, 
assuming no change in consumption and profits, a 1% increase in government spending would be asso-
ciated with a change of –0.01% (+ 0.03%) – 1.12% (+ 0.49%) in business investment (equation [4]), 
which is in a 95% confidence interval between 0.1% and 2.2%. Of course the confidence placed on these 
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estimates cannot be large, as in the 1961-1990 sample government spending has a non significant 
effect on investment, and the effect does not appear either in a sample 1950-2013 (results not shown). 
But if the negative effects of government profligacy on business investment are not fully supported by 
the data, the supposedly stimulating effects of government spending on private investment are abso-
lutely at odds with the results. Certainly the whole evolution of government spending becoming with 
the pass of time an increasing part of the national economy (Table 1, Figure 2) and the negative corre-
lations at lag zero between government expenditure and investment (Tables 3 and 4), demonstrate that 
spending by the government is increasingly needed to keep the level of output. Against the simplistic 
views of Tea Party activists, private business seems quite clearly insufficient to keep the US economy 
afloat—as revealed by government spending at levels similar to those of World War II during the past 
three decades. 
 
9. Implications for business-cycle theory 
Controversies on the fluctuations and crises of the market economy go back to the 19th century, when 
Sismondi blamed crises on insufficient consumption and rejected Say’s views that production creates 
sufficient purchasing power for the output to be purchased, Marx wrote abundantly on the cycle of in-
dustrial crises as caused by a tendency of profitability to decline, and Juglar referred to commercial 
crises as generated by the interplay of commercial and financial phenomena.7 Though not many authors 
in the 19th century were interested in economic crises, “panics,” or “gluts” as they were referred to at the 
time, among those who paid attention to these phenomena the consensus was that every ten years credit 
panics occurred more or less at the same time that markets overflowed with unsold goods (Mills 1868, 
5-40). Then, when economists started to talk about “trade cycles”, “business cycles” and “recessions” in 
the late 19th century, a whole series of putative causes for the cycles were proposed. Since the profession 
had fully embraced Say’s law and the tendency of markets to be efficient and to clear following the in-
visible hand, it was logical do not look for causes of sharp downturns inside the economic system, they 
had to be exogenous. Thus W. S. Jevons attributed the business cycle to weather events determined by 
                                                 
7 Sismondi presented his views on crises in his Nouveaux principes d'économie politique, Marx in Capital, and 
Juglar in Des Crises commerciales et leur retour periodique. General discussions about these works can be 
found in Schumpeter (1954), Morgan (1990), Burns and Mitchell (1946) and Mattick (1974). 
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sun spots, Henry L. Moore proposed a similar scheme based on effects of the planet Venus, and Ells-
worth Huntinton proposed that fluctuations in business activity were actually consequences of fluctua-
tions in mortality (Schumpeter 1954; Morgan 1990; Huntington 1920). But all these theories fitted very 
poorly with the data.8 They were object of criticism among others by Wesley Mitchell, who in 1913 pub-
lished his Business Cycles, an impressive study on the phenomenon in Great Britain, Germany, France, 
and the United States. After a meticulous consideration of observed data, Mitchell theorized the cycle 
as an endogenous phenomenon of what he called “the money economy.” Influenced by his “atheoretical” 
empirical investigations of the business world, and also probably by Veblen’s ideas, Mitchell viewed the 
modern industrial system as a network of free enterprises that produce merchandise with the purpose 
of obtaining money profits. Mitchell saw spending in capital goods as the leading force pushing the 
economy forward, with profitability of business as the basic engine determining investment. Thus for 
Mitchell the business cycle is an autonomous phenomenon determined by the endogenous fluctuations 
of profits and investment (Mitchell 1913; 1951). 
Though Mitchel’s views, for a while continued by A. F. Burns, were part of mainstream economics 
during a few decades (Moulton 1949; Burns 1954; Mitchell 1951; Burns and Mitchell 1946), a remarka-
ble event in the development of ideas on the business cycle took place at the end of the 1930s. After 
years of economic and political turmoil the Society of Nations asked Jan Tinbergen to dedicate his tal-
ents to study business cycles. Analyzing the scarce economic statistics available at the time, Tinbergen 
concluded, confirming most insights of Wesley Mitchell, that business cycles are basically a fluctuation 
in investment determined by a previous fluctuation in profits (Tinbergen 1939b; 1939a). The study was 
however strongly criticized, as supposedly containing major flaws, both by John Maynard Keynes and 
by the rising start of the anti-Keynesian field, Milton Friedman (Morgan 1990). Thus Tinbergen’s views 
(Tinbergen 1950) were marginalized along with those of Mitchell, who had been condemned for his 
“atheoretical” views (Koopmans 1947, 161-172). For the next three decades the influential ideas were 
those of the Keynesians, who in greater or smaller degree rejected the Smithian ideas of the invisible 
hand and laissez faire and promoted the new concepts of animal spirits and the need of government 
                                                 
8 Except that of Huntinton, though everything suggests that he got the direction of causality wrong, as shown by 
modern investigations that have found traffic injuries, heart attacks and general mortality increasing in expan-
sions (Ruhm 2007, 829-848; Ionides, Wang, and Tapia Granados 2013, 1362-1385), with atmospheric pollution 
playing an important mediating role (Heutel and Ruhm 2013).  
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involvement in the economy. Keynesians took control of nascent econometrics from the Cowles Com-
mission and to provide reasonable-looking estimates consistent with the idea that the economy was 
under the control of fiscal and monetary policy made many undiscussed assumptions and ad hoc ad-
justments that simplified the macroeconomic models and produced apparently accurate predictions 
with insufficient data and inaccurate theory (Sims 2012, 1187-1205). It was also the time when the idea 
of profits as a key variable in macroeconomics went into oblivion.    
But the Keynesian hegemony had never been complete and indeed declined in the 1960s and 1970s, 
so that in the recent decades that were considered by Krugman the dark age of macroeconomics much 
of the research on business-cycle issues looked back for inspiration to the traditional ideas of Smith, 
Ricardo and Say that Keynes had at least partially rejected. Starting from these classical ideas, that is, 
from general equilibrium, authors of the RBC school produced models of the economy that were then 
compared with the real movements of the economy, i.e., “calibrated” to make them somewhat realistic. 
Both Keynesians and RBC authors produced complex models of the economy that supposedly enabled 
appropriate forecasts, but the fruits of this high-level math were scarce, as the global crisis that started 
in 2008 was unexpected for the RBC school as well as for most macroeconomists. 
The philosopher’s stone of economics is the elimination of the business cycle. Keynes said the right 
remedy for the business cycle is “in abolishing slumps and thus keeping us permanently in a quasi-
boom” (Keynes 1937, pp. 209-223) (p. 322). Thus it is not surprising that the leaders of the profession 
have repeatedly claimed, in different ways, that the business cycle is either gone or under control, which 
would imply that the market system is basically stable and can evolve steadily—with or without the 
guidance of the experts. Paul Samuelson declared in 1955 that with proper fiscal and monetary policies, 
“our economy can have full employment and whatever rate of capital formation it wants” and in the 
1960s he concluded that business cycle theorists had done themselves “out of a job.”  Then the business 
cycle was declared obsolete (Bronfenbrenner 1969) and the new concept of “growth cycle” (Moore and 
National Bureau of Economic Research 1961) was substituted for it for a while, as if the mild economic 
fluctuations observed in the 1950s and 1960s implied that in the future the economy would not alternate 
between boom and bust, but much more happily between strong and mild growth (Klein 1997, 289). 
More recently the concepts of the New Economy and the Great Moderation (Bernanke 2004) were pro-
posed, both implying that economic turbulence is not to be expected. Playing the same tune as in Ravel’s 
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Bolero, in his 2003 Presidential Address to the American Economic Association Robert Lucas stated 
that the central problem of economic policy, that of preventing depression, “had been solved for all 
practical purposes” (Lucas 2003, 1-14) and two years later the Chair of the Federal Reserve declared his 
awe at the degree of harmony and efficiency revealed by international finance and international trade. 
It would be hardly imaginable, Greenspan said, “that today’s awesome array of international transac-
tions would produce the relative economic stability that we experience daily if they were not led by some 
international version of Smith’s invisible hand” (Greenspan ). All this shows that, as an institution, the 
economic profession had declared for more than half a century that major economic disturbances were 
out of the question, so it is not surprising that in 2008 the Great Recession “caught most economists 
flat-footed,” as Nicholas Mankiw put it (Mankiw 2010, BU6). Statements on the ability of economic 
policies to prevent recessions are no longer heard, and contrarily, Larry Summers, Paul Krugman, Mar-
tin Wolf and other leaders of the economic profession have recently expressed their beliefs in extended 
conditions of stagnation for the near future, or even the likelihood of another major recession coming 
soon. 
But, can recessions be prevented or at least forecasted as Queen Elizabeth wanted? David Andolfatto, 
Senior Vice President of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, recently wrote in his blog comparing 
forecasts of volcano eruptions and economic crisis as similarly difficult. Andolfatto joked on those econ-
omists “who successfully predicted 10 out of the past 2 recessions,” and claimed that there seems to be 
an insatiable demand for soothsayers, “clearly a case of demand creating its own supply.” But then, in 
passing, he delivered his own forecast: “there will be another major financial crisis on the scale experi-
enced in 2008” (Andolfatto 2015).  
In any field, there are two basic methods for developing forecasting skills. One is to observe as many 
cases as possible of the phenomena and try to establish the statistical regularities of it, which allows for 
empirical forecasts. Family doctors do not known why most cases of common cold cure themselves in 
about a week, may be two, but they have verified that in their practice and that regularity allows them 
for a lot of quite good forecasting. Regretfully in the social sciences the method of looking for regularities 
seems to be disliked by quite a number of investigators, who focus themselves on one particular case—
e.g., the Great Recession—rather than searching for common patterns in the increasing number of re-
cessions that the pass of time makes available to study. The other method for developing forecasting 
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skills is to develop a theory, a causal scheme of why things happen. Economists are right that the 
business cycle is irregular, but too bad, most of them lack any theory of what causes the business cycle, 
what are its causes. Again, for this purpose it is proper to look at many cases of the phenomenon rather 
than focusing on the particularities of one case. Furthermore, elements for a theory of the business cycle 
exist to a large extent. If investment, the accumulation of capital, reduce profits, and profits themselves 
stimulate investment—as it was proposed by different authors in the past—the elements are set for a 
Lotka-Volterra predator-prey scheme which generates cycles. The findings of this paper are largely con-
sistent with it. But government spending negatively affected by investment, and investment negatively 
affected by government spending seem to be additional levers discovered in this paper that generate 
oscillations and contribute to the fluctuations of the economy. 
It is understanding of a phenomenon what enables us to control it. Control without understanding is 
just appearance that leads to disaster, as in the story of the sorcerer's apprentice. But sometimes even 
proper understanding is insufficient for efficient control. Geologists understand earthquakes quite well, 
and nuclear engineers understand atomic energy perfectly, but that allows us no control at all on earth-
quakes, and only partial control on atomic energy, as the cases of Chernobil and Fukushima clearly 
prove. After the Great Recession and two centuries of disagreement on the causes of economic crises 
that never stop occurring in spite of assertions that they will not, it is uncontroversial that the market 
economy is one of the most complex systems that human beings have ever studied. Claims that we are 
able to control it are now increasingly rare, they are mostly done by politicians, while leading economists 
acknowledge with circumspection that they do not know the causes of the basic dynamics of the econ-
omy, the business cycle. But to advance in the understanding of a complex system it is fundamental to 
identify the key variables that determine other variables and determine the evolution of the system. 
Keynes once said that  
given the psychology of the public, the level of output and employment as a whole depends on the amount of investment. I 
put it in this way, not because this is the only factor on which aggregate output depends, but because it is usual in a complex 
system to regard as the causa causans that factor which is most prone to sudden and wide fluctuation (Keynes 1937, pp. 209-
223). 
    
This statement looks quite extraordinary in the context of what Keynes wrote in The General Theory 
and the subsequent papers explaining it. In the opinion of a specialist in complex systems, Mark New-
man, this statement looks like something written not in the 1930s, but half a century later. That in a 
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complex system the cause of all other causes is the factor which is most prone to sudden and wide 
fluctuation is an idea that for Newman would hold if the widely fluctuating factor considered to be caus-
ative has fluctuations which are correlated with the thing that it is supposed to be causing. “If it is un-
correlated then it matters little how widely fluctuating it is—it's still just noise,” but “I would surely say 
that it is strong correlation that signals (but does not prove) causation, rather than the mere amplitude 
of fluctuation (…); as a general rule of thumb, there may be something to Keynes' statement. In practice 
it may work out quite well if one routinely looks to the most widely fluctuating variables for causative 
influence.”9 
 Using Keynes statement as a rule of thumb, then we should look not to investment but to profits as 
the variable in the system which is both correlated with aggregate output and has the widest oscillations. 
But profits, the “bottom line,” which are such a major issue in the world of business (Shaikh 2004, 371-
380; Mattick 2011; Norris 2008) are rarely mentioned in modern investigations on the business cycle. 
To a large extent and leaving aside sociological determinants of what economists investigate and sup-
port, this can be attributed to the influence of John Maynard Keynes and Milton Friedman and their 
followers in their rejection of the “empiricist” and “atheoretical” views of Mitchell and Tinbergen. 
In a commanding work paradoxically forgotten today, Controlling Factors of Economic Develop-
ment, Harold Moulton commented in 1949 on business cycle theories based on the role of profits in the 
economy:     
A very different type of explanation of depressions is built upon the fact that capitalistic business enterprise is conducted 
in response to the profit motive. Since business commitments are undertaken in the hope of profits, if anything happens 
which seriously reduces or even threatens to reduce profit margins, business commitments are quickly curtailed and de-
pression ensues (...) This line of interpretation does not offer much hope of any easy remedy. Depression appears as an 
inevitable outgrowth of the conditions which developed in the preceding boom period (Moulton 1949). 
 
10. A concluding forecast 
As I mentioned, for most of the 19th century a consensus existed that the commercial crises were peri-
odical with a cycle 10-year long (Mills 1868, 5-40). Then in the late 19th century and early 20th century, 
crises clearly occurred at irregular intervals, and Wesley Mitchell concluded that business cycles were 
an irregular phenomena that, in duration, “vary from more than one year to ten or twelve years” (Burns 
                                                 
9 From an email sent by Mark Newman to me, 6/13/2012. Newman is Professor of Physics at the University of 
Michigan, Ann Arbor, and external faculty member of the Santa Fe Institute. He is known for his contributions 
to the fields of complex networks and complex systems, for which he was awarded the 2014 Lagrange Prize. 
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and Mitchell 1946). Certainly the “cycle” is irregular, it is hard to disagree with  Mankiw that it does 
not follow a regular and predictable pattern. It is also true however that during the past two centuries 
recessions have recurred with a periodicity which has certain limits. For instance, in the past 40 years 
business-cycle downturns occurred in the mid-1970s, early 1980s, early 1990s, at the turn of the century 
and in 2008-2009. I have argued elsewhere (Tapia Granados 2014) that all these were actually crises of 
the world economy which were also visible as recessions of many national economies, the US economy 
among them. These five crises that can be individualized by misnaming them First Oil Crisis (mid 
1970s), Second Oil Crisis  (early 1980s), Eastern Europe Crisis (early 1990s), Asian crisis (early 2000s) 
and Great Recession (2008-2009) were separated by intervals which fit well in the duration of the busi-
ness cycle according to Mitchel, “from more than one year to ten or twelve years.” More important, each 
of these recessions started at a time when profits of US corporations—which probably are a good 
proxy for profits worldwide—were falling, as they had reached a peak at least one or two years ear-
lier. Thus peaks in the share of profits before taxes are observable in 1973 before the First Oil Crisis, in 
1978 before the Second Oil Crisis, in 1988 before the Eastern Europe Crisis, in 1997 before the Asian 
Crisis, and in 2006 before the Great Recession (Figure 2).       
The findings of this paper show that a major regularity of the US economy is that movements in profits 
are followed by movements in investment in the same direction, and movements in investment are fol-
lowed by movements in profits in the opposite direction. These two mechanisms put together are suffi-
cient to generate a cycle. Indeed, from econometric analyses a number of authors have concluded that 
the US economy is profit-led (Barbosa-Filho and Taylor 2006, 389; Rada and Taylor 2006, 487-500; 
Mohun and Veneziani 2008, 107-130). In a recent analysis of OECD countries, economists of the Bank 
of International Settlements have found a major role of profits determining investment and low levels 
of profitability as cause of sluggish economic growth in recent years (Banerjee, Kearns, and Lombardi 
2015).  
As I write this on May 2015, it has been 7 years and a half since the start of the Great Recession dated 
December 2007 by the NBER. If recessions occur with the rough regularity that they had in the past two 
centuries, when rarely more than a decade passed without one, we are getting close to the time of a new 
one. On the other hand, and more important, profits of US corporations have recently stagnated and 
started to decline after growing since 2008. According to recently reported NIPA data, profits had a  
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peak in 2013 (Figure 2). Corporate profits before 
taxes which between 2012 and 2013 increased 4.2% 
from $2.02 trillion to $2.10 trillion dropped 0.8% to 
$2.09 trillion in 2014. Considering just domestic indus-
tries, corporate profits before taxes dropped 0.5% in 
2014 after rising 5.4% in 2013, while profits after taxes 
dropped 10.3% in 2014 after gaining 5.4% in 2013 (Fig-
ure 9). There are also reports that indicate poor profits 
of hedge funds in 2014 (Stevenson 2015, B1), which 
suggests low levels of average profitability in the global economy. 
If, as in past decades, falling profits are followed by 
decreasing investment, a recession will very likely oc-
cur soon. Considering the results of statistical models, 
the “regularity” of the business cycle, the fact that prof-
its are falling, and the present condition of the other 
parts of the world economy it can be concluded with 
some confidence that a recession of the US economy 
will occur in the next few years. Equations [1] to [4] 
can be used to provide forecasts for the following 
years. They are presented in Table 10. Forecasted de-
clines of business investment by 1.6% and 1.3% in 2016 
and 2017 are substantial, but even more substantial 
are declines of 0.4% and 0.2% in consumption, as the 
only other years in the sample 1929-2014 in which 
consumption growth was negative were 2009, 1938, 
and 1930–1933.    
Of course, these forecasts are based in models that predict just a fraction—60% or 70% in the best of 
cases—of the variation of business-cycle series, so they cannot be given much credibility re magnitude 
and timing of the next recession. But they allow for forecasting a recession that will likely occur in the 
Table 10. Consumption, business investment, 
profits after taxes (domestic industries) and 
government expenditure, observed values 
(2010-2014) and forecasted values (2015-2024). 
Numbers are first differences of log-trans-
formed values (in 2009 dollars), so they can be 
interpreted as rates of growth 
 
Year 
 
Cons. 
 
Invest. 
 
Prof. 
Govern. 
expend. 
2010 2.3 0.3 22.9 2.9 
2011 2.6 6.8 1.5 -0.9 
2012 1.8 6.7 12.0 -0.9 
2013 2.1 2.6 3.8 -1.0 
2014 2.3 5.9 -12.3 0.8 
Forecasted values  
2015 0.0 0.5 -7.2 -0.2 
2016 -0.4 -1.6 -0.6 0.4 
2017 -0.2 -1.3 1.9 0.3 
2018 0.0 -0.3 1.5 0.1 
Figure 9. Corporate profits before taxes (dots) and af-
ter taxes (squares) of all corporations (gray lines) and 
domestic industries (black lines), billion dollars 
 
 
 
Source: NIPA tables 1.10 and 1.12, accessed April 2015. 
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next few years and will likely be an important one. A further reason to make the prediction less con-
fident is that all the previous numerical analyses in this paper refer to the US economy, when the proper 
unit to analyze is the economy of the world, which in my view is now is a full organic unity which has its 
own dynamics, so that national economies depend on it. Analyses of series of output, investment, and 
consumption in the G7 countries have revealed a “world business cycle” with important national ele-
ments but also major common components, particularly in output and investment (Gregory, Head, and 
Raynauld 1997, 677-701). Thus analyses of variables pertaining to a large fraction of the world economy 
as the US economy may allow for important insights in the dynamics of the system, but they cannot 
provide a full picture of it, and for the moment, many factors related to the world economy are unmeas-
ured and unknown.  
Considering all that has been said I may quantify the degree of confidence in my prediction by using 
Bayesian terminology, so that my priors are 80% that a recession will start in 2015 or 2016, 90% that it 
will occur no later than 2018, and 99% that it will occur before the end of the decade. As in the mid-
1970s, early 1980s, early 1990s, 2001 and 2008, it will be very likely a world economic crisis, and given 
the enormous volumes of debt now present in the world economy, the precarious situation of banks in 
many countries, the weak or negative economic growth in many European countries, the chronic prob-
lems of the Japanese economy, and the rapid deceleration during the past three years of most so-called 
emerging economies like China and other BRICS, it is to be expected that this recession may be as great 
or even greater than the Great Recession. I agree with David Andolfatto on that. 
Something that tends to make the prediction of recession in the next few years less likely is the fact 
that oil prices have been now falling for many months. It is known that peaks in the price of oil occurred 
immediately before the recessions of the mid 1970s, early 1980s, early 1990s, 2001 and 2008 (Hamilton 
2009, 215-267). Indeed these “oil shocks” have been proposed by James Hamilton as the exogenous 
shocks that cause recessions and that RBC authors never identified (Parker 2007) (p. 80-81). But in-
creases in oil prices previous to recessions of the world economy seem to a large extent an endogenous 
phenomenon, part of a general increase in prices of raw materials generated by the rising global demand 
during expansions (Kilian 2009, 267-278; Stuermer 2014). It is not inconsistent with the view that an 
endogenous fall of profitability is the key determinant of recessions to consider that particular factors 
at particular times may trigger the crisis. The contemporaneity of the political breakdown of the Soviet 
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bloc and the world crisis of the early 1990s is not an accident, indeed the precipitous drop of exports 
to the USSR was a key factor leading the economy of some countries like Finland to a deep recession at 
that time. While the causal loop between profits and investment mines the expansion leading eventually 
to its end and to the start of the recession, by dampening profits, increases in the prices of energy and 
raw materials during the boom bring closer the tipping point in which profits stagnate and then drop, 
thus leading to drops in investment and a general downturn. Consequently, falling prices of energy tend 
to uphold profits, promote consumption and stimulate the economy at large. That can be a major factor 
for the maintenance of present conditions in international markets, so that the world economy could 
continue for a while muddling through in the seemingly never ending aftermath of the Great Recession. 
That oil prices have been falling because the demand for oil is low in a world economy which is presently 
anemic, almost nobody disagrees. What is less clear is to what extent falling prices of energy can stim-
ulate the economy delaying the world recession that will eventually occur. My glass ball is not better 
than that. 
 To my knowledge, this is the first investigation of the business cycle using DAGs. I am quite sure it 
will not be the last.   
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